9781400837823_Web.pdf by Biddle Stephen(Author)

Author:Biddle, Stephen(Author) [Biddle, Stephen(Author)]
Language: spa
Format: epub
Published: 2010-12-08T08:46:27+00:00

Experimental Tests

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185

Figure 9.1. Simulation Experimentation Results, Battle of 73 Easting coordination afforded by maintaining formation over an extended approach march). Yet there was neither the elaborate preliminary reconnaissance, nor the preparatory artillery program, methodical fire-and-movement, or dismounted infantry action of modern-system breakthrough tactics. Nor was there the local numerical advantage typical of modern system differential concentration: as a scouting element, the Americans were outnumbered by their opponents at 73

Easting. The Janus/73 Easting combination enables powerful counterfactual analysis while surmounting some of the usual verisimilitude challenges of simulation, but it imposes some constraints in exchange: while important elements of the modern system can be observed in U.S. tactics, to turn the battle from a hasty assault in exploitation to a deliberate attack in breakthrough would change the context too completely to sustain the ceteris paribus assumptions inherent in counterfactual analysis.5

Each scenario was run ten times.6 Mean vehicle losses for the two sides and associated standard errors are reported in table 9.1 and illustrated graphically in figure 9.1.

RESULTS

The results are strongly consistent with the new theory, and inconsistent with the orthodox view. In particular, they suggest three key observations.

1. Against a modern-system defense, 2d ACR’s technology overmatch did not provide victory at very low losses.

Excursion scenario A assumes that both of the Iraqi errors considered here are corrected, and thus that Iraqi defensive tactics are brought fully into alignment

186

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Chapter Nine

with the modern system (that is, the above-ground revetments of the historical battle are entirely replaced with below-ground, turret-down positions from which the occupants move up to a hull-down posture upon acquiring a target; and functioning observation posts provide tactical warning of the attackers’ approach). 7 Coalition technology, Coalition force employment, and all other aspects of the base case are held constant. As a consequence, simulated U.S. vehicle losses rise from only two in the base case to almost fifty (more than 70 percent of total U.S. strength) in the excursion scenario results, while Iraqi losses fall from eighty-six to about thirty, even given the technological advantages of the M1A1, the effects of Coalition air supremacy, and the skilled handling of the U.S. attack.8

Why does force employment have such a large effect on attacker casualties here? The answer has to do with the way the Iraqi failure to implement the modern system played into the strengths of U.S. technology.

Many have argued, for example, that thermal sights gave the United States an enormous target acquisition advantage in 73 Easting, where a raging sandstorm blocked the Iraqis’ simple optics but not the Americans’ advanced sights. 9 For superior target acquisition range to be useful, however, there must be exposed targets to acquire. In the base case, the Iraqis’ poorly constructed above-ground revetments guarantee this. In fact, the berms advertise the defenders’ locations to attackers with advanced sights. In excursion scenario A, on the other hand, modern-system position preparation causes the Iraqis’ vehicles to be concealed in turret-down positions unless their own crews see targets. At long range, where thermal sights enable the attackers to see

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